

sign of better things to come. For, while there is nothing wrong with popular entertainment consisting of folk art, what is needed more than anything in the cultural impasse of our time is a bridge between the world of crude folk art and that of consciously cultivated high art. The deep division between the two spheres, which is so painfully manifest in the United States, is unhealthy and dangerous. Only conscious control of the electronic mass media, not in a totalitarian sense, but to provide a better admixture of material for the important culturally conscious minority and a chance for the masses to sample such material and to develop their tastes towards it, can counteract the dangerous tendencies towards a polarisation of masses and élites which is only too apparent in the United States today.

Two Decades in Another Country: *Hollywood and the Cinéphiles*

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In a 'history' of the impact on Europe of American popular culture, the systematic elevation of Hollywood movies to the ranks of great art would make an intriguing chapter. Legend has it that the feat was accomplished almost single-handedly by motivated and volatile intellectuals from Paris sticking their heads together and pulling off a brilliant public relations stunt that came to be known as *Cahiers du Cinéma* and *Nouvelle Vague*.¹

The legend bears some relation to the facts, but only insofar as it has allowed a very crude version of a very complicated cultural phenomenon to gain widespread or at least topical currency. Today, at a time when film criticism is again increasingly oriented towards theory, the more controversial sides of the episode seem to have been put to rest.² Nonetheless, two implications deserve to be studied more closely. One is the feedback which Hollywood's European fame has produced in the United States, and the value now attributed by Americans to their indigenous cultural assets in this field. It is noticeable, for instance, that after a very fitful start, when news from France was greeted with derision and incredulity in New York and Los Angeles, the Hollywood cinema, especially the films of the 1930s, '40s and '50s, has come to be recognized and often nostalgically celebrated as a (if not *the*) truly original contribution of the United States to art and aesthetics in this century.³ The fact that there exists an American Film Institute,⁴ and that courses are being taught on the American cinema at countless universities, indicates a change of attitude quite as decisively as do the antiquarian labours and pastiche work of Peter Bogdanovitch (cf. *The Last Picture Show*, *What's Up Doc?*, and *Paper Moon*), and the many New York movie

houses which are taking notice of the 'director's cinema' when billing their re-run double features, while even five years ago only the stars would have been the attraction.

—The other question is prompted by a more general reflection: what does enthusiasm for Hollywood tell us about intellectual or scholarly interest in popular culture, and particularly American culture? There is little doubt that this enthusiasm is, within Europe, predominantly and characteristically French. Critics in Italy, Spain and even Poland have subsequently taken their cue from the Paris line, but as an example of highbrow interest in lowbrow culture the phenomenon only makes sense if one concentrates on France. This is not to deny that Britain produced the most important pro-Hollywood journal outside France,⁵ or that as a consequence an ideologically significant, though brief debate flared up in the early 1960s between the 'aesthetic Left', the 'Left' and the 'liberal Right' in England. But historically, the important piece of evidence to keep before one's eyes is that after the Second World War, a number of French cinéophile intellectuals (some of whom — but by no means all — went on to found an eventually very influential platform for their views, the said *Cahiers du Cinéma*)⁶ began to apply a highly literate sensibility and a sophisticated appreciation of aesthetic problems to a body of films (roughly the Hollywood output from 1940 onwards) which on the face of it appeared impressive mainly by its quantity. This output had previously existed in 'serious' writing, with the exception of a handful of films by Welles and possibly Ford, only, in the wide-meshed grid of sociological generalisation, the more so, since on another level the promotional activities of the film industry were deemed to speak for themselves: the star-system, gossip-columnists, fan-clubs and other accessories of the show-biz machinery proliferated the image of crass commercialism, unspeakably vulgar, sensationalist, and turning out on celluloid and in newsprint a never-ending flood of cut-price fantasies. Or so it seemed to the educated European. And it rendered the products of such efforts beneath contempt — until, that is, rumour got round of how in France they thought differently.

To understand the change, we need a brief historical flashback: in the 1920s the cinema, including the American cinema (Griffith, Stroheim, Chaplin), enjoyed an enormous intellectual prestige, condensed in many a weighty volume on film aesthetics and theory published during the decade. They unanimously hailed a new art, which they assumed to have almost magical possibilities. With singular optimism, Elie Faure would attribute to the cinema the power to transform the traditional arts, and Bela Balazs would sketch a new vision of man which the screen was to project and

communicate to the masses. Reading their books today, one becomes aware that the cinema seemed to promise at once a new aesthetic religion and social revolution, the regeneration of a tired civilization. Apart from such slightly millennial hopes, which can also be found in the writings of Delluc, Eisenstein, Arnheim, Pudovkin and Vertov, avant-garde artists such as Léger, Artaud, Dali and Cocteau were equally spellbound by the medium.

The invention of sound at the end of the 1920s dashed this euphoria once and for all. Worried by the way the cinema was more and more forcefully developing in the direction of a realist-representational-medium given over to narratives of dubious merit and originality, artists in the modernist vein came to regard the cinema as aesthetically reactionary, a throwback in fact to the nineteenth century. Film criticism throughout the 1930s did not recover from the blow, and the decade which witnessed an unprecedented economic expansion of the film-industries in Europe and America also saw critics only too willing to conclude that popularity automatically spelled aesthetic nullity. The new art of the talking picture came to be written off as irredeemably 'commercial', peddling to nothing but escapist entertainment, or worse still, pernicious demagoguery.⁸

Because it displayed commercialism and bad taste with gusto and little sense of shame or self-consciousness, Hollywood had to bear the brunt of the disappointed expectations which quickly relegated the cinema from a potentially major artistic force to a conveyor-belt dream factory. This did not prevent some of the most well-known directors in Europe from emigrating to California, and although most of them left for good political reasons, especially from Germany, not all felt themselves to be heading for dire exile: Ernst Lubitsch, Murnau, Fritz Lang, Max Ophuls, Otto Preminger, Douglas Sirk, Robert Siodmak, Billy Wilder became established as successful Hollywood directors; René Clair and Jean Renoir made important films in America, and so did Alfred Hitchcock. The case of Hitchcock is particularly instructive, since he left England under no political pressure and at the height of his fame at home.

Faced with this massive exodus from Europe, critics rarely if ever used the opportunity to reassess their idea of Hollywood and their judgement of the films it produced. More apparent was the way they gave vent to disillusionment and ill-temper which made the émigrés seem deserters to the cause and hucksters of their talents. The reception of Hitchcock's American films in Britain can stand for many similar attitudes: '*Spellbound* and *Notorious* (are) classic examples of brilliance run to seed, . . . heartless and soulless ingenuity';⁹ or about *The Man Who Knew Too Much*: 'a vulgar and

debilitated remake by Hitchcock of his splendid old Gaumont-British melodrama, demonstrating once again the pernicious effect of the Hollywood system on a once brilliant entertainer.¹⁰ Even *Vertigo*, a film of rare subtlety and as hauntingly intense as any romantic masterpiece, was the object of a scurrilous and misinformed attack by the leading film journal of the day.¹¹

Among the chorus of nostalgic voices bitterly bemoaning better days and pouring scorn on Hollywood, a few French critics, notably Roger Leenhardt and subsequently André Bazin, stand out by their lucid seriousness and moderation. Bazin, in an article he first published in 1945 and later gave the imposing title 'Ontologie de l'Image Cinématographique'¹² translated this difference of tone and emphasis into a critical position with a theoretical basis. His ambition was nothing less than to rethink the dichotomy between silent film and sound film, European cinema and Hollywood. The first had paralyzed film theory since the 1920s, and the second had made film criticism a stagnant backwater of highbrow prejudice, condescending occasionally to being amused by 'entertainers'. Bazin's system, as far as one can constitute it from his journalism and the numerous pieces of more sustained criticism,¹³ based itself on an altogether different distinction, that between directors who 'believe in the image and those who believe in reality'.¹⁴ Directors who believe in the image, according to Bazin, believe in it as a representation of some concept or idea, and their method consists in using the representational nature of the moving image to construct a synthetic reality of the intellect, in short a rhetoric or iconography, to serve an analytically conceived purpose or message. By contrast; those who believe in reality treat the image as a means to 'illuminate', 'explore' etc. the thing represented; they are committed to the aesthetics of *Anschauung*. Instead of montage techniques, superimposition and collage effects, their main aesthetic resources are depth of field (i.e. compositional tensions within the frame), camera movements (tracks, pans, lateral travellings which produce levels of ambiguity and multiple points of view), and finally long takes which allow an action to develop its own dramatic momentum while accumulating the kind of energy inherent in duration itself — as opposed to 'cutting up' a scene into snippets of action and reassembling them in the editing.

However impartial Bazin's system might have appeared, in practice it implied a strong value judgement in favour of what he himself called the 'phenomenological' approach to filmed reality. Applied polemically, his crucial argument was intended to separate those film-makers who, like Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Vertov, 'tampered' with reality because of their didactic intentions, from those who

'respected' the continuity of action as it appears in 'real life' and who deployed the temporal-narrative dimension of the cinema instead of searching out and experimenting with its conceptual-analytical possibilities. In Bazin's mind the 'phenomenological' tendency, evidently the one he preferred, was associated with the work of Stroheim, Dreyer, Murnau, Flaherty and Renoir during the silent period and Wyler, Welles, Bresson, Rossellini and again Renoir since the 1930s and the advent of sound.

One can see that Bazin was at least as anxious to dissolve the European/American dichotomy as he was to posit a continuity and tradition of aesthetic conception, bridging the supposed gulf between silent and sound era. In effect, he was able to acknowledge theoretically, and consequently to validate, the historical development which had pushed the cinema towards becoming a predominantly narrative medium (the very development which had disaffected the intellectuals), but only at the price of virtually 'outlawing' the modernist strain and formulating for the sake of clarity and sharpness of definition an 'either/or' position which in its turn distorted a good deal of the evidence at hand:

What deserves to be remembered is that Bazin's efforts were directed to 'naturalizing' the compositional techniques of the feature film, which implied playing down the artificiality and manipulative nature of all filmed reality. In this he went against modernist and post-modernist suspicion about the status of fiction and fictions. Bazin's line of argument, conservative though it may seem in a literary context, could however claim to be empirical, in that it made sense (even if limited) of the predominant historical development in the cinema, without having to retreat to a sterile rejection of the narrative film or indulge in fashionable pessimism about the evils of commercial mass-culture. Implicitly, it came near to giving a negative definition of 'popular' cinema, rejecting the kind of self-consciousness about medium and means of expression that constitutes the level of truth and authenticity in much twentieth century art. The material basis of popular art is different: stereotypes, formulaic plots, clichés, melodramatic emotions and situations ensure a high degree of recognition, and the unabated popularity of gangster movies, Western thrillers, comedies and musicals confirms the expediency if not the value of this basis.¹⁵ On the other hand, in order to show that the end-product was different from the ingredients, Bazin had to resort to a very intellectualised, philosophically demanding hypothesis about the nature and origin of the cinema, which makes a case for Hollywood only by subsuming it under that rather rarified category of 'phenomenological realism', and thus a perfectly legitimate species of traditional (i.e. highbrow)

art. The American cinema found itself culturally upgraded, and rather than presenting it as a specifically popular art with a corresponding analysis of popular aesthetics, Bazin in fact explained and interpreted it by a recourse to Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and French Catholicism.

It is altogether characteristic of Bazin's position and the influence he exerted not only on French film critics, that in some important respects he by-passed very smartly the debate about art and entertainment, popular and avant-garde; to which the options usually boil down. He did this by focussing on a director such as Renoir (who was as familiar with Marivaux or Flaubert and Zola as he was with modern painting, the novels of Georges Simenon and the midinette music-hall ambiance of Montparnasse); and on the American side, putting heavy emphasis on Wyler (born in Germany) or Welles, the most avowedly intellectual director to have come out of the Hollywood studio system. For Bazin, Welles was an innovator (along very European lines) and to be preferred to a more genuinely 'representative' director like John Ford, the very epitome of the seasoned practitioner and virtuoso professional in the popular movie idiom.

Although these correctives and the balancing of emphasis within the appraisal of Hollywood were subsequently supplied by Bazin's disciples on *Cahiers du Cinéma* (the 'Hitchcoco-Hawksiens' as they were called), the tendency towards validating the 'genre'-oriented narrative cinema in terms of high art became, if anything, even stronger in the magazine, with, as I shall hope to show, consequences that revealed significant contradictions. Bazin, because of his philosophical vocabulary, his Christian existentialism, his abstention from any kind of political controversy, helped in the main to soften up the prejudices of the educated middle-class viewer towards the American cinema by making him aware of the beauties in a Boetticher Western or a Hitchcock thriller, and ranging their films as equals alongside those by Mizoguchi, Fellini, Renoir or Bergman. Despite his strictures against Eisenstein and the Russians, it was Bazin's catholicity of cinematic tastes and his 'textual' approach to individual films that made his criticism enduring and which compensated for the equivocations that surrounded his notion of what defines artistic achievement of a specifically popular kind.

The problem will perhaps be clearer if we look at Welles, whose early Hollywood films (*Citizen Kane*, *The Magnificent Ambersons*) created a sensation in Europe, as indeed in the United States, though there for somewhat different reasons. As I have already hinted, in Europe he tended to be hailed as an innovator, the man who was finally giving some artistic stature to the American talkie, who had

invented the aesthetics of the deep-focus shot, revitalised flashback techniques and dramatic montage, pioneered narrative ellipsis and the use of Freudian imagery to give his characters psychological depth. But Welles' case furnished arguments both for and against Hollywood: married as he then was to the pin-up idol of American G.I.s, Rita Hayworth, and making 'genre' films like *Lady From Shanghai* and *The Stranger*, he nevertheless played very convincingly the part of a persecuted genius, misunderstood and thwarted by the Hollywood system. To any dispassionate observer he appeared to be facing Hollywood, as it were, with one cheek flushed by boyish excitement ('the biggest and most expensive electric train set that anyone was ever given to play with'), and a half ironic, half sardonic smile on the other. His films breathe a sarcasm that was confusingly directed against himself as well as the people he was working for — just the kind of attitude that recommended him to interested but sceptical (about Hollywood, that is) European intellectuals, but not at all to a popular audience.

Welles' later career bears out just how atypical and in many ways deeply antagonistic he was — not only to the working conditions imposed by even so flamboyantly nonchalant a studio boss as Howard Hughes at RKO, but to the whole Hollywood way of thinking about movie making and popular entertainment. Welles was, and remained, indifferent if not hostile particularly to the missionary idealism paired with a sound business sense which runs through the generation of producer-studio heads who had shaped the Hollywood of the 1930s and 40s. Like Cecil B. de Mille, Irving Thalberg and Samuel Goldwyn before them, Meyer, Selznick and even Zanuck possessed a curiously explicit 'ideological' outlook on their work, and a by no means crude understanding of the media and their audiences made them self-appointed apostles of their country's often contradictory aspirations and ideals. In the films they commissioned and approved from their directors and scriptwriters they were as concerned with reinforcing specifically American socialization processes and synthesizing the overall patterns of American history (always seen, to be sure, from the point of view of the economically and socially most dynamic groups) as a Henry James or Edmund Wilson was concerned with finding out what constituted American identity and American culture.

The conflict of East and West Coast, industrialisation and agriculture, the Frontier, the Civil War, urbanisation, the immigrant experience, the Depression have all been reflected, and often in a highly critical manner by Hollywood films, as indeed have social evils — from prison conditions and corruption in local and state government to racism, right-wing republicanism or such old

favourites as extortion and protection rackets in boxing or baseball. That the dramatic pattern inevitably engineered a 'personalised' solution to social problems and that they distinguished only with difficulty the dividing line between the moral and the political is a matter that affects a lot of social thinking in America. The fact remains that the standard genres from Western to psychological thriller and soap opera melodrama have evolved on close analogy to underlying psychological and social tendencies, and the far from innocuous comedies of Tashlin or Billy Wilder have consistently dramatised the internal contradictions of representative American social experiences.¹⁶ Not only is Hollywood ideologically transparent in the way films aim at internalising and psychologizing the public and social issues of American history, but their aesthetic and stylistic devices are geared towards locating the value and purpose of that experience in recognisably commonplace situations and everyday contexts, mainly by means of a visual-dramatic rhetoric, a strategy of persuasion as 'classical' and subtly adaptable as any which past civilisation have produced in periods of hegemony. During the apogee of Hollywood, even the most outlandish adventure story or musical extravaganza had to build its dramatic structure and narrative development on a familiar, easily identifiable subsoil of emotional reactions, drawn from the basic psychological dilemmas of the age. It is this emotional proximity to the viewer maintained across an immense variety of subjects, situations and filmic genres that one has to reckon with in any argument about the nature of popular culture in the cinema. And Welles, although his first four films or so (before he became sidetracked into the avatars of Shakespearomania) were squarely within the national quest for the American psyche, was nonetheless in his stylistic approach far too idiosyncratic and 'expressionist' ever to achieve or probably ever to aspire to the powerfully emotional realism of the commonplace, for the sake of which Hollywood directors, producers and script-writers fashioned iconographic stereotypes, infinitely recycling plots, psychologically one-dimensional characters, and a completely codified, carefully sifted image of the American (moral, social and geographic) landscape. By sheer force of repetition it imposed itself successfully as a symbolic system of notation within which very differentiated statements could be articulated, and it also constituted a dramatically acceptable, and for a long time ideologically accepted set of conventions by which to picture the dynamic interplay of reality and fantasy that Europeans find so characteristic of *'l'homme, américain moyen sensuel'*.

These aspects of Hollywood and the resolutely 'popular' aesthetics underpinning them were not on the whole given much attention in

the heyday of *Cahiers* criticism. Support of a different kind for the American cinema came at about the same time from surrealist groups, who let their love and admiration for American 'pop' — the comic-strip, science fiction, pin-up eroticism, pulp fiction — generously embrace Hollywood movies, first somewhat ambiguously ransacking them, especially the B productions of the smaller studios, for conscious or involuntary sublimities in the way of visual or emotional shocks and for that elusive quality of the 'insolite' by which imaginative authenticity could be gauged. Several 'genres' received their special attention, thus the horror movie and exotic adventure film ('le merveilleux et le fantastique' — both terms were and still are used as descriptive categories), gangster movies and thrillers with a strong romantic flavour ('le film noir'), musicals and 'low-brow' comedies (e.g. Jerry Lewis). In all cases, what was stressed was the subversive element in 'pop', where Hollywood could provide additional fire-power in the revolt against bourgeois notions of appeasement, sobriety and taste in art.

It is obviously essential to keep the middle-class, consciously intellectual approach to the American cinema via Welles, Wyler and the catholic left around Bazin, distinct from the militant anti-bourgeois, anti-academic enthusiasm of the surrealists. However, since their differences had the good fortune to be brought out into the open and ripen with the years into sharp antagonisms, the invaluable effect was to generate committed and partisan debates, thus putting pressure on the trenchancy of the arguments: the Hollywood cinema during the mid-1950s in France decidedly prospered on the crest of waves agitated by highly polemical clashes of opinion in the Paris magazines, carried into the country on the groundswell of the ciné-club movement which had already made France the most cinematically literate country in Europe. Another factor that can scarcely be overestimated was Henri Langlois' Cinémathèque, begun during the war in association with Georges Franju and Jean Mitry, but which only after the war became the unique film archive that it is today, unique mainly because from the start Langlois did not operate any form of pre-selection, least of all one dividing cinematic 'art' from 'entertainment'. He tried to preserve all the celluloid he could lay his hands on, and presented in the rue d'Ulm, as at the Palais de Chaillot, a collection from which each fraction could draw and build its own tradition and genealogy of cinematic art. Given the transitory nature of film-viewing, Langlois played a crucial role as a democratising and stimulating force, since it was only because the films were around and could be seen and re-seen that critical engagement was possible and disagreement worthwhile.

† If this had been all, the vogue for Hollywood movies might not

have amounted to more than a passing intellectual fad. What can't be ignored, however, is the special relation which French literary culture entertained with American writing, and the attitude of official France towards America in the first decade after the Second World War. The years of German occupation and the Vichy Régime had given the Americans the halo and aura of liberators: They had rescued Europe from fascism, they had handed France back to the good French, and even left-wing circles for a time looked upon the United States, its political system, its democratic institutions, its productivity and prosperity with something resembling respect. Jean Paul Sartre visited America on several occasions and published long, guardedly appreciative or occasionally enthusiastic pieces in *Les Temps Modernes* and elsewhere.¹⁷ Since the 1930s French intellectuals had taken pride in having 'discovered' modern American literature, as Baudelaire had 'discovered' Poe: not just for France, but for the rest of the world and especially for Americans themselves. Malraux wrote with real knowledge and insight about Faulkner at a time when Faulkner had barely left the tutelage of Sherwood Anderson, and in his famous preface to the French edition of *Sanctuary* he spoke of it as 'the incursion of Greek tragedy into the detective story'.¹⁸ Sartre's articles on *The Sound and the Fury* were long regarded as definitive statements on Faulkner the 'modern' novelist,¹⁹ while Gide waxed enthusiastic over Dashiell Hammett's *Red Harvest*. Dos Passos, Dreiser, Steinbeck, Lardner, Caldwell, O'Hara were as seriously discussed and as widely read as Scott Fitzgerald, West and Hemingway. Last but not least, the mainstay of every station bookstore and newsagent in the country was American thrillers in translation: a good deal of the famous 'série noire' publications were American or modelled on American novels, and they popularised an image of America — violent, individualist, bitter with the cynical cool of idealism gone sour, though energetic and vibrant; a fabrication compelling enough to do without a philosophical commentary and still register as the concrete embodiment of existential alienation, 'Angst' and the nihilistic 'acte gratuit', seemingly lived on the scale of an entire nation. At this level of projection, and drawing on similar inspiration, the American novel and the cinema naturally reinforced each other to produce an image in which America figured largely as a state of the imagination, a frame of mind, much in the way it had served an earlier generation of European intellectuals — those in Germany during the 1920s, for instance, of whom Brecht is probably the best-known exponent:

But the kind of revolution in aesthetic standards and attitudes to popular culture that was under way in France by the end of the 1940s is equally well illustrated by the book of a literary critic and

scholar published in 1948, and which for the first time attempted to fuse the literary and philosophical interest in American fiction and culture with the grass-root popularity of the movies: Claudé-Edmonde Magny's *L'Age du Roman Américain*, extremely original in its conception, was able to catch in argument and example the climate of informed opinion as well as the general pro-American bias accurately and eloquently enough to become an instant classic. What is interesting is the glimpse it gives of the evaluative criteria that made a study of the cinema a worthwhile intellectual activity. Her thesis is briefly this: The modern American novel — and here she means mainly Dos Passos, Steinbeck, Hemingway and Faulkner — is exemplary in two ways. It has managed to break through the distinction between highbrow and low-brow fiction, and it has at the same time assimilated into narrative forms some of the important aesthetic achievements of imagism and symbolism, such as objectivity, neutrality of tone, a reliance on description, a deceptively non-introspective use of language and speech or syntax that possessed the muscularity of action. Yet this was not the result of studying the symbolists or Flaubert, Joyce, Gide or Proust, but because American novelists had willingly entered into a reciprocal relation with the movies and filmic techniques, learning from them what they could. Considerable space is devoted to Dashiell Hammett, whose methods of description and characterisation Magny analyses in some detail. This she uses to argue against the middle class bias in French fiction, and she proceeds to sketch an alternative history of the modern novel, approached through a terminology borrowed from the cinema: there are chapters on montage and cutting in film and novel, on ellipsis and narrative structure, on scenic presentation of character and spatial form. The summing up of the first part of her argument is particularly instructive:

'We are here concerned with a new convergence of the same kind as that which has already been discussed — a convergence between the results of psychoanalysis, behaviourism, and sociology and the new vision of the world that the movies and the novel communicate to us almost unconsciously, by virtue of their technique alone. It is no longer a question of a kinship between two forms [...] but of one between the abstract themes that haunt contemporary thought and the conclusions that are suggested by the evolution toward an epoch of purely aesthetic techniques belonging to the domain of the emotions rather than of the intellect. [...] But this is not the only reason for its [i.e. the American novel's] success: it also gives us a more simple and direct, and therefore more universal vision of man than that

proposed by our traditional literature. Through its masterpieces we glimpse the promise of a new humanism. If its major importance is its content, however, why is it its technique that is most imitated? To use Sartre's apt phrase, it is because the technique is pregnant with a whole metaphysics.²⁰

One has to read this passage in its historical context: the reference to Sartre, to a new humanism, to an immediate, because emotional truth are not fortuitous. Magny lends her voice to the same guarded social optimism which during the post-war period led Sartre to modify his philosophy in the direction of dialectical materialism, but one can also see how a more 'theological' existentialism might be attracted to American literature and the movies — that of André Bazin for instance, and reflected in the tenor of the early period of *Cahiers du Cinéma*. What French intellectuals expected from things American were works of fiction that could serve as creative models, representative of their own situation and embodying specifically modern tensions — between intellect and emotion, action and reflection, consciousness and instinct, choice and spontaneity. It is remarkable for example how many of the film critics who rallied behind the Bazin-*Cahiers* line did in fact go on to make films themselves, using their knowledge of the Hollywood cinema as a constant reference point in elaborating their aesthetics. The names are too well-known to need much comment: Chabrol, Godard, Truffaut, Rohmer, Rivette, Melville, Doniol-Valcroze and others.

Magny's book, with its copious references to films, also brings striking confirmation that the French were ready and able to draw on a cinematic literacy in a general debate about aesthetics which would have been unthinkable anywhere else in the world. She is not at all self-conscious or apologetic about mentioning movies like Curtiz's *Angels with Dirty Faces* in the same breath as Faulkner's *Light in August* to illustrate a point about narrative ellipsis and indirection, or to compare favourably techniques of anti-psychological characterisation in Hawks's *Bringing Up Baby* with those to be found in Camus's *L'Étranger* or a novel by Aragon. In her book the cinema exists, and not just as the potentially vital art form of the future (in the way it had done for so many theorists of the 1920s), but by virtue of actual and contemporary films that were deemed to hold their own in a comparison with writing and literature.

Consequently, what gave *Cahiers du Cinéma* its impact and made it known abroad was the dedication with which its contributors put the prestige of French highbrow culture behind their enthusiasm for Hollywood. With benign self-confidence they made the cinema appear in almost every respect on an equal, if not a superior footing

with contemporary literature, and often enough with the great art of the past. 'Griffith is to the cinema what Bach is to music';²¹ 'Fuller is to Welles what Marlowe is to Shakespeare'²²: these were the kind of opening gambits that made Anglo-Saxon critics very nearly choke with indignation. But the recklessness of such claims was not simply 'pour épater' those who preferred to keep their art clean or resented cultural trespassers. It was part of an effort to analyse film history and thereby consolidate critical standards appropriate to the medium: 'Stendhal is superior to Losey up to the point where the subject of his description passes from intention and mental rumination to its incarnation in a universe of bodies and forms. At this precise instant, Losey becomes incommensurably superior to Stendhal.'²³ The references across the arts were ultimately only a means of establishing priorities and a scale of evaluation within the cinema itself. This becomes clearest where *Cahiers* criticised films that didn't come up to what one could expect from the director or the genre he was working in: George Stevens's *Giant*, a hugely successful epic of the 1950s and James Dean's last film, is found wanting because 'its eclectic morality leaves no room for that spirit of satire, of severity too, nor for the sense of the grandiose, the tragic, the perilous which comes so naturally to countless American films. No comparison between the complaisance with which the characters here cultivate their clear conscience and the beautiful generosity of Nicholas Ray's heroes.'²⁴ However partially *Cahiers* critics judged films, their great merit was to judge them by criteria derived from other, comparable films and not from idealist notions of what 'art' or the cinema ought to be like. Yet since they were committed to the idea of the director as the creative centre, they had to retreat by necessity to a relatively tiny area of cinematic specificity, fortify it intellectually and proceed from there to conquer the whole territory of interpretation and evaluation. Given the fact that in Hollywood the director often had no more than token control over choice of subject, the cast, the quality of the dialogue, all the weight of creativity, all the evidence of personal expression and statement had to be found in the mise-en-scène, the visual orchestration of the story, the rhythm of the action, the plasticity and dynamism of the image, the pace and causality introduced through the editing. This is why the mise-en-scène could transform even the most apparently conventional Western into a profound and nuanced statement about personal guilt, redemption, existential choice, divided loyalties and moral growth (as in Anthony Mann's work), or a multi-million epic could explore the dialectics of personal commitment and moral distance, passionate spontaneity and short-sighted rashness (e.g. Otto Preminger's *Exodus*).²⁵

Both concepts, however, that of the 'auteur' and 'mise-en-scène' on which was founded the *Cahiers's* revaluation of Hollywood popular art, operated not only as aesthetic value judgements and hermeneutic principles of exegesis; but they also had in the historical context a polemical edge: the notion of the 'auteur', the temerity of assuming his very existence at the heart of the vast Hollywood machinery was intended to counter the dismissal of American films as impersonal, standardised consumer products and to militate for the attitude where every film is to be viewed on its own merits according to criteria evolved historically and empirically from actual films and the conditions under which they were made.

Nonetheless, the *Cahiers* position on Hollywood and its directors was, for all the virulence and conviction with which it was argued, a fragile one. The polemical edge cut both ways; and the contradictions that resulted from constantly trying to play both ends against the middle became in time more and more noticeable. By the early 1960s it had become all but untenable: *Cahiers* defended Hollywood and the studio system, but made a cult of the individual artist that was suspiciously intellectual and European; they recognized the uses of genre formulations and conventions in a medium with universal appeal, but they praised in preference those films that managed to subvert the conventions and transcend the limits of the genre; they approved of the aura conferred by a star ('*Charlton Heston est un axiome. Il constitue à lui seul une tragédie*')²⁶, and they made great play of the fact that films appeal to the emotions and the senses rather than the intellect; but their own system of interpretation required a highly sophisticated, aesthetically conscious sensibility; they were fond of underlining the cultural significance of Hollywood films, but their main critical plank, the idea of *mise-en-scène*, meant at the crudest level 'form' to the exclusion of 'content', and in the hands of more skilled critics, an inordinately high regard for the strategies of aesthetic distance by which a director could transform overt content into a coded message accessible to the initiated.

For a time these contradictions were fruitful, especially where they produced the kind of friction which made the stylistic differences between Wyler and Ford, Fuller and Losey, Hawks and Anthony Mann live issues which sparked off debates about fundamentals. The *Cahiers* line remained creative as long as these tensions were felt to be intellectually challenging and a useful weapon in another struggle closer to home: that against academicism in film-making and literary-mindedness in criticism. To militate for a 'pure cinema' of *mise-en-scène* was to fight against the stodgily theatrical cinema of Delannoy and Cayatte, and enthusiasm for American mass-culture was meant to defy the growing embour-

geoisement of popular entertainment in France and Europe. That *Cahiers's* criteria were 'only' aesthetic and their mode of appreciation élitist highlights sharply the conflict of the intellectual when trying to articulate the values inherent in non-intellectual art, or indeed any art that grows from different cultural and social preconditions: doomed to resort to his own language, he necessarily distorts his own intuition and transforms the object of his study into a metaphor. France's relations with American culture are very much a case in point. If it took existentialism to make American fiction intellectually respectable, and if it took the histrionics of Orson Welles to give artistic lustre to Hollywood, it is scarcely surprising that a literary critic like Magny feels the need to appeal to the 'universally human' as the proper antidote to the exclusively middle-class orientation of the modern French novel, and that film critics are tempted to vindicate their interest in the action movie or the melodrama by an occasional recourse to Jansenism,²⁷ phenomenological vocabulary and a theory of concrete universals. The dilemma of finding a non-metaphorical critical discourse is endemic to all contemporary intellectual inquiry, even where this is Marxist or structuralist in inspiration.

Historically, *Cahiers* suffered from its internal contradictions as soon as its position began to harden into a dogma, and when the struggle on the home front brought victory in the shape of the 'nouvelle vague' and the journalistic ballyhoo created around it. By entrenching themselves in the all-importance of the *mise-en-scène*, they were continually forced to soft-pedal the more political implications of their preference for such 'ultra' directors as Hawks or Ford, and they were unable to bring out such significant American attitudes as the conservative radicalism of, say, Walsh or Fuller. And this is where their sharpest opponents, the critics around the magazine *Positif* and inheritors of left-wing surrealism scored most of their points. In two famous articles,²⁸ the Bazin-*Cahiers* aesthetics of an optimum of continuous time and space, of integrated narrative and action, directorial indirection rather than expression, drama through depth of field rather than montage etc., was mercilessly dismantled and declared to be an ideological smoke-screen disguising political timidity and impotence. At the height of the Algerian war, Bazin's 'liberal' aesthetics of ambiguity was denounced in no uncertain terms as a sitting on the fence, as the cunning tergiversations of conservatism, as the reactionary deviousness of Catholic obscurantism: '*... cette méchante église de campagne qu'est le système de Bazin*'.²⁹

In many ways this attack was grossly overstating a valid enough case. It was unfair if one looks at the ideological complexion of the

two or three directors whom Bazin praised most warmly: for instance Renoir and Rossellini. The latter was closely associated with neo-realism which of course at the time was considered very much as an artistic movement of the Left, and Renoir, a prominent member of the Popular Front, could by no stretch of the imagination be called a 'dyed-in-the-wool' conservative. In this context, the Hollywood films that Bazin liked were absorbed into that floating populism — generous, emotional but also rather nebulous — which many French intellectuals, and especially those of the Catholic Left, had taken away from the days of the Résistance.

What was suspect was Bazin's pseudo-philosophical terminology and the failure of his disciples to bring their political options explicitly to bear on their critical system. The ambiguously metaphoric status of *Cahiers's* commitment to Hollywood made their search for a cinematic tradition at the same time creatively productive and intellectually confusing, and once the critics had become film-makers in their own right, Hollywood lost much of its use as a club to swing at the establishment, thus giving some substance to the charge made by *Positif* that it was all a rather sorry spectacle of bad faith and rationalisation.³⁰ For *Positif*, though equally accepting the importance of Hollywood, argued from quite different premises: by and large they too subscribed to the notion of a 'director's cinema' and to a similarly textual approach, but their pantheon of directors was determined by an overall interpretation of American culture and society. Coming from an explicitly Marxist left their inclination was to look for a comparable equivalent to European left-wing thinking, and they believed they found it in the predominantly liberal or ex-Marxist left, present in Hollywood through directors such as Huston, Lösey, Kazaň, Mankiewicz, Rossen and some of the directors around the producer Mark Hellinger. *Positif's* interest in Hollywood during the 1950s might be said to have coincided with that shown by McCarthy and the House of Un-American Activities Committee's special investigation. . . .

Positif maintained that the American cinema became an ideologically significant index of the 'state of the union' precisely because of the dialectical interplay between the directors' quest for specific statements in a cinematic language designed to level off personal expression in the interest of communicability, and the economic pressures to market a product that fulfills as nearly as can be the already existing expectations of the greatest possible number. More historically-minded than *Cahiers*, *Positif's* staff were interested in the American cinema because they were interested in America, and not the other way round. Hollywood being a means rather than an end, they were able to keep 'faithful' to it when the tide began to turn in the middle sixties.

The same cannot be said of *Cahiers* whose line was not only internally unstable, but externally vulnerable to the historical developments at large. The cinema on whose chosen masterpieces they had lavished such eloquent praise became during the same time embarrassingly powerful and economically dominant, so much so that many of the *Cahiers* critics turned film-makers were suddenly confronted with the more materialist side of their aesthetics, namely the stranglehold which American production companies and distributors had on the European scene and on finance: the late 1950s and the 1960s were marked by the successive stages of an extremely successful move to corner markets, buy out competitors and invest capital and thus build up control in the national film industries in Britain and on the Continent.

Cahiers found it difficult to cope with this evidence, to which must be added the growing malaise among European and especially French intellectuals about American influence in world affairs — military, economic, social and cultural. Their response was to assume a heavily nostalgic tone, the films that came out of Hollywood didn't please as well as they had done, and even though it was obvious that the American film industry was undergoing a decisive internal evolution, their critical system proved inflexible and unresponsive. It had to be maintained intact, or broken. And when the rise of television began to starve the cinemas of their mass-audiences, and Hollywood production companies dissolved their studios at home and moved to Pinewood, Cinecittà or some village in Spain or Yugoslavia, *Cahiers* thought they could detect an altogether different product, with which they were impatient and bored, and they felt justified in speaking of the Hollywood cinema in the past tense.

The more, therefore, historical events threw into prominence the interventionist role of the United States in world politics, whether by force of arms, monopolising markets or cultural exports (which the film industry spearheaded long before the rock/pop/beat scene created a quite different European-American interdependence with its own vast commodity market), the more evident it became that praise of Hollywood could and did lend indirect but influential support to American ideology abroad. The events of May 1968 made the *de facto* break with the American cinema which began in 1963 de rigueur for the *Cahiers* contributors, and the magazine holds today an extreme left position of Marxist-Leninist persuasion, thus severing itself from its own past as radically as from Hollywood itself. Godard's press-release for his film *La Chinoise* (1967) rang the changes for everybody to hear:

'Fifty years after the October Revolution, the American industry rules cinema the world over. There is nothing much to add to this

statement of fact. Except that on our own modest level we too should provoke two or three Vietnams in the bosom of the vast Hollywood-Cinecittà-Mosfilm-Pinewood-etc. empire, and, both economically and aesthetically, struggling on two fronts as it were, create cinemas which are national, free, brotherly, comradely and bonded in friendship.³¹

If the decline of Hollywood in critical esteem among a certain section of European intellectuals can be seen to have such an explicitly political side to it, responding with considerable swiftness to the increase of anti-American feeling in social and political thinking, one is tempted to conclude two things: one, that the rise of Hollywood was equally affected by a specific ideological situation, which I have briefly sketched; but which the first line of *Cahiers* critics managed to displace onto the purely aesthetic level. The second point is that the episode of Hollywood in another country contains the lesson that any critical system or aesthetic discourse which is unable to refer to and reflect upon the social and economic conditions under which the medium or the art in question produce and maintain themselves is liable not only to be incoherent and distorted, but to remain ignorant about the nature of its own activity. The cinema, with its curious status, halfway between an art form of self-expression and a capital-intensive industry of international importance, may put this into particular relief, but it is a sobering thought that it might be equally true of less 'popular' manifestations of modern culture. The French intellectuals who championed Hollywood by raising it to the level of high art in order to snatch it from the clutches of the sociologists had to discover to their cost that they were themselves the victims of the ideology they had affected to transcend.

Notes

Preface

1. Karl Grun, 'The Stuff Marketing Dreams are Made of' in *Europa*, vi, March 1974.

C.W.E. Bigsby: *Europe, America and the Cultural Debate*

1. F. Scott Fitzgerald, *Tender is the Night* (New York) 1934, p.55.

2. Eldridge Cleaver, *Soul on Ice* (London) 1969, p.114.

3. Richard B. Morris, ed. *Encyclopaedia of American History* (New York) 1965, p.471.

4. The European figure appears in *Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1971*, p.205, published by the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. The UK figure appears in the *Digest of Tourist Statistics* No.2, p.52, published by the British Tourist Authority.

5. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *The American Challenge*, trans. Ronald Steel (New York) 1968, pp. 191-2.

6. Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy* (Cambridge) 1971, p.19.

7. *Ibid.*, p.18.

8. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Vol. II, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York) 1945, p.460.

9. *Ibid.*, p.98.

10. *Ibid.*, p.100.

11. *Ibid.*, p.103.

12. Vol 1, pp. 32-3.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-4.

14. Quoted in Dover Wilson, 'Editor's Introduction', *Culture and Anarchy* (Cambridge) 1971, p. xviii.

15. F.R. Leavis, *Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture* (Cambridge) 1930, p.26.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

17. F.R. Leavis, *Nor Shall My Sword* (London) 1972, p.206.

18. *Ibid.*, p.60.

19. Karl Jaspers, *Man in the Modern Age*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (London) 1951, p.117.

20. *Ibid.*, p.81.

21. Quoted in Reyner Banham, *Theory and Design in the First Machine Age* (London) 1960, p.103.

22. *Ibid.*, p.159.

23. Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (London) 1961, p.14.

24. Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future* (London) 1961, p.7.

25. Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimen-*

logical *Yearbook of Religion in Britain*, 6, 1973, pp. 136-55. For a wider-ranging but journalistic treatment, see George Malko, *Scientology: The New Religion* (New York) 1970.

9. On Mormon migration, see Walter Mulder, *Homeward to Zion: the Mormon Migration from Scandinavia* (Minneapolis) 1957; for Britain, P.A.M. Taylor, *Expectations Westward* (London) 1965. See also Gilbert W. Scharffs, *Mormonism in Germany*, (Salt Lake City) 1970.

Jens Peter Becker: *The Mean Streets of Europe*.

1. Robert Graves and Alan Hodge, *The Long Week-end* (Penguin) 1971, p.297. Originally a witty sentence in Michael Innes's *Lament for a Maker* (London) 1971, p.159.

2. D. E. S. Maxwell in *American Fiction: The Intellectual Background* (New York) 1963, p.275 takes the same view.

3. Raymond Chandler, 'The simple art of murder', in *Pearls are a Nuisance* (Harmondsworth) 1964, p.193.

4. Leslie A. Fiedler, *Love and Death in the American Novel* (New York) 1960, p. xviii.

5. W. H. Auden, 'The Guilty Vicarage: Notes on the Detective Story, by an Addict', *Harper's Magazine* 196, May 1948, p.408.

6. cf. Robert Warshaw, 'The Gangster as Tragic Hero', in *The Immediate Experience* (New York) 1970 and Stephen L. Karpf, 'The Gangster Film: Emergence, Variation and Decay of a Genre, 1930-1940', Unpubl. Doct. Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1970.

7. See for example: Brander Matthews, 'Poe and the Detective Story', *Scribner's Magazine* 42, 1907; Alma E. Murch, *The Development of the Detective Novel* (London) 1968, Paul G. Buchloh and Jens P. Becker, *Der Detektivroman*.

8. George Orwell, 'Raffles and Miss Blandish', in *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell* (Harmondsworth) 1970, p.254

9. *ibid.*, p.254-5.

10. *ibid.*, p.255.

11. *ibid.*, p.260.

12. Quoted in: Klaus Kunkel, 'Ein artiger James Bond: Jerry Cotton und der Bastei-Verlag', in Jochen Vogt (ed.), *Der Kriminalroman* (Munich) 1971, p.564.

13. cf. Jens P. Becker, *Der englische Spionageroman* (Munich) 1973, pp. 132-64.

14. Raymond A. Sokolov, 'The Art of Murder', *Newsweek*, 22 March 1971, p.54.

15. *ibid.*, p.58.

16. Nina Grunenberg, 'Der Hinterhof lässt grüssen: Krimis zeigen, wie das Leben spielt', in *Die Zeit*, 21 September 1973.

17. In his fragment 'Tulip'. cf. *The Big Knockover and other Stories* (Penguin) 1969, p.316.

18. cf. John A. Williams, 'My Man Himes: An Interview With Chester Himes', *Amistad* 1, 25-93 and Philip Oakes, 'The Man who goes too fast', *Sunday Times Magazine*, 9 November 1969, especially p.71.

Gérard Cordesse: *The Impact of American Science Fiction on Europe*

1. Pierre Versins, *Encyclopédie de L'Utopie et de la Science Fiction* (Lausanne) 1972.

2. Even in European comics, science fiction was not organised into an autonomous sub-genre; coexistence prevailed. When the space operas *Buck Rogers* and *Flash Gordon* reached France before the Second World War, their epic tone contrasted with the humorous angle of most French comics (*Zig et Puce au vingt-et-unième siècle*).

3. cf. H. Bruce Franklin, *Future Perfect, American Science Fiction of*

the Nineteenth Century (New York) 1966.

4. H. Gernsback, *Ralph 124C41+* (New York) 1958, p.58.

5. *Ibid.*, p.1.

6. L. S. Sprague de Camp, *A.S.F. Handbook* (New York) 1953, p.221.

7. *Ibid.*, p.171.

8. John Carnell ed., *The Best From 'New Worlds Science Fiction'* (London) 1955.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

10. *Ibid.*, p.13.

11. *Ibid.*, p.13.

12. *Sometime, Never: Three Tales of Imagination* (New York) 1957.

13. J. G. Ballard, *The Drowned World*, (New York) 1962.

14. J. G. Ballard, *The Voices of Time* (New York) 1962.

15. J. G. Ballard, *Terminal Beach* (New York) 1964.

16. Michael Moorcock, Preface to *The New SF* (London) 1969, p.8.

17. J. G. Ballard, in *Ambit* 29 (London) 1967.

18. The ideology of the post-1950 production was made 'more acceptable' to European sceptics with the rise of dystopia, however qualified and challenged by orthodox American writers.

19. Damon Knight, the only American writer to have crossed the language barrier, points this out in *13 French Science Fiction Stories* (New York) 1965: 'At first there were few acceptable submissions; lately there have been so many that the magazine has bought up material for years ahead' and judges French writers thus: 'at least a dozen can stand comparison with the best Anglo-Saxon writers of science-fiction', which sounds over-enthusiastic.

20. Eric Losfeld, *Barbarella* (Paris) 1962.

21. Jean Ricardou, *La Prise De Constantinople* (Paris) 1965.

22. T. D. Clareson, ed., 'Robots in Science-Fiction', in *S.F.: The Other Side of Realism* (Ohio) 1971.

23. Thomas M. Disch, a message to an American SF conference, the Spring of 1967; reproduced in *England Swings SF*, Judith Merrill, ed., (New York) 1968.

Roger Lewis: *Captain America Meets the Bash Street Kids*

1. Reitberger and Fuchs, *Comics, Anatomy of a Mass Medium* (London) 1972.

2. Robert Crumb, *Zap comics*.

3. George Orwell, 'Boys' Weeklies', *Inside the Whale and Other Essays* (Harmondsworth) 1962.

4. Stan Lee in *Rolling Stone*, 16 September 1971.

5. Frederic Wertham, *Seduction of the Innocent*, (New York) 1954.

6. *Captain America*, 122.

7. *New York Times Magazine*, 1 October 1972.

8. *Slow Death*, 2. Last Gasp Eco Comics.

9. *Rolling Stone*, 16 September 1971.

Martin Esslin: *The Television Series as Folk Epic*

1. Kracauer, *From Caligari to Hitler* (Princeton and Oxford) 1968.

Thomas Elsasser: *Two Decades in Another Country*

1. The term 'nouvelle vague' started its life as a journalists' tag at the Cannes Film Festival of 1959, when a dozen or so new French films by unknown, though not always particularly young directors got rave reviews from the international press. Among the films were works by Chabrol, Godard, Truffaut (who won the Festival Prize for *Les quatre cents coups*). See on this an important but highly critical study: R. Borde, F.

Buache, J. Curtelin, *Nouvelle Vague* (Paris) 1962.

2. Recent writing on the cinema tends again to follow the French lead and seems to concentrate on 'the processes of signification' and the linguistic-semantic status of the image as sign. See C. Metz, *Langage et Cinéma* (Paris) 1971. In English, some of the main issues are set out in P. Wollen, *Signs and Meaning in the Cinema* (London) 1969, which also contains a chapter on the 'Auteur Theory'.

3. The man who has done most to popularise the French view of the American cinema in the United States is Andrew Sarris. Under his editorship *Film Culture* devoted a special issue to Hollywood (no.28, Spring 1963). In January 1966 Sarris brought out the first issue of an ambitious though short-lived publishing venture, *Cahiers du Cinéma in English*. The controversy over Sarris's appraisal of Hollywood directors can be studied in two numbers of *Film Quarterly*: Pauline Kael's 'Circle and Squares' (Spring 1963) and Sarris's reply 'The Auteur Theory and the Perils of Pauline' (Summer 1963). See also the Introduction to Andrew Sarris, *The American Cinema; Directors and Directions 1929-68* (New York) 1968.

4. The American Film Institute was inaugurated in June 1967.

5. *Movie Magazine*, whose first issue appeared in 1962.

6. *Cahiers du Cinéma* was founded in 1951, as the successor to *La Revue du Cinéma* (first issue in 1946). Its editors were André Bazin, Jacques Doniol-Valcroze and Eric Rohmer.

7. See for instance: Ricciotto Canudo, *L'Usine Aux Images* (Paris) 1927; Louis Delluc, *Cinéma et Cie* (Paris) 1929; Germaine Dulac, *L'Art Cinématographique* (Paris) 1927; Elie Faure, *L'Arbre d'Eden* (Paris) 1922; Bela Balazs, *Der Sichtbare Mensch* (Vienna) 1924; V. Poudovkin and L. Kouleshov, *Film Regie and Film*

Manuscript (London) 1928; Sergei M. Eisenstein, *Film Form* (London) 1949 and *The Film Sense* (London) 1948; Rudolf Arnheim, *Film als Kunst*, 1932; Raymond Spottiswoode, *A Grammar of Film* (London) 1935.

8. The best-known example of this school is of course S. Kracauer, *From Caligari to Hitler* (New York) 1947.

9. *Sequence*, Winter 1947.

10. *Sight and Sound*, Summer 1956.

11. *Sight and Sound*, Autumn 1958.

12. originally entitled 'Problèmes de la Peinture', in *Esprit*, 1945.

13. André Bazin, *Qu'est-ce que le Cinéma*, 3 vols, Paris 1958-61.

14. 'L'Evolution du Langage Cinématographique' op.cit. vol 1, p.132.

15. 'De 1930 à 1940, c'est le triomphe à Hollywood de cinq ou six grands genres qui assurent alors son (i.e. the American cinema's) écrasante supériorité.' op.cit. vol 1, p.136.

16. see Jeffrey Richards, *Visions of Yesterday*, London 1973, especially the chapter on Frank Capra and Populism; also Raymond Durnat, *The Crazy Mirror* (London) 1970.

17. see J. P. Sartre, *Situations III* (Paris) 1949.

18. see A. Malraux, 'Une Préface pour Sanctuary', *Nouvelle Revue Française*, November 1933.

19. see J. P. Sartre, *Situations I* (Paris) 1947.

20. G. E. Magry, *The Age of the American Novel* (New York) 1972, pp. 100-1.

21. *Cahiers du Cinéma* no.70, April 1957, p.43.

22. quoted in R. Roud, 'The French Line', *Sight and Sound*, Autumn 1960, p.167.

23. *Cahiers du Cinéma* no.107, May 1960, p.24.

24. *Cahiers du Cinéma* no.70, April 1957, p.44.

25. For a comparable approach in English, see R. Wood, 'Exodus', in *Movie* no.2, 1963, and T. Elsasser,

'Exodus', in *Brighton Film Review* vol.2, no.5, 1969.

26. *Cahiers du Cinéma* no.107, May 1960, p.24.

27. e.g. 'William Wyler ou le Janséniste de la Mise-en-Scène' in *Qu'est-ce que le Cinéma*, vol 1, p.149.

28. *Positif*, nos. 46, 47 (June, July 1962).

29. *Positif*, no.46, p.59.

30. see *Positif* no.122, December 1970, R. Benayoun, 'Les Enfants du Paradigme', pp. 7-26.

31. quoted in Jean Narboni and Tom Milne (eds), *Godard on Godard* (London) 1972, p.243.